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BOOK REVIEWS
POLITICS IN AMERICA.

By D. W. Brogan, Harper & Brothers, New York: 1954.

Pp. 467.
Ever since Lord Bryce and de Tocquiville, Europeans have studied the American
Republic with increasing admiration and with the hope of ascertaining the reasons for
the successful endurance and prosperity of a continental Republican Democracy, by
which the new world is contrasted with the old. The author of this remarkably perceptive study, Politics in America, has been a lifelong student of our political ways
and an intimate, on the scene observer during his frequent visits to this country.
Indeed, this is his sixth volume on America and Americans, of which the present one
is the correspondent to an earlier and less sympathetic study, Government of the People, which appeared in 1933. Two decades ago, Professor Brogan questioned the
ability of our institutions to cope successfully with the major disorders and grave
challenges that followed in the wake of the depression. In the present volume the
author has happily penetrated to the source of the vitality and resiliency which has
made for the continuity of our national constitutional history, and fashioned reliable
and responsible American habits which equally react, however slowly, against radical
individualism and creeping authoritarianism. The author writes with the warm sympathies of a master of a subject which has captured both his intelligence and genuine
affection.
The book is comprised of nine essays written in a spritely conversational style
which is borne along with the fluency of endless insights and evaluating reflections. It
is not a systematically organized work and its methodology falters in the middle chapters perhaps because of their broader sociological content for which an essayist cannot
properly fulfill the demands of empirical tests. In the preface, he states his purpose:
"The purpose of this book is simply to make the American political system intelligible.
It has no thesis except that the system has its own logic, its own justification, and is, in
general, a success. It cannot be easily altered. . . . This system, too, should be studied
in its own terms; its successes and failures seen in their American context."
The first chapter, The Character of the American Polity, explains, perhaps for his
British readers, the reason for this success, namely, the American conception of constitutionalism as a written basic law in the light of whose supremacy the constitutionality of all statutory law may be tested. By far his best chapter (and the longest, one
fourth of the book) is the ninth, Presidentand Congress. The student of political science
will be fascinated with the ease and lucidity of Professor Brogan's penetrating analysis of the relationship between these two branches of the American government and
the running comparisons with their English counterparts. In this volume, the author,
now grown into an intimate appreciation of the uniqueness of the American system,
has become prudently cautious about the governmental alterations he had so freely
urged upon us two decades ago. Then he wrote:
"The American government is so organized that it is difficult to do anything at all,
impossible to do some things and difficult or impossible to undo things once they have
been done, without what may well be disastrous delay." *
Today, deeply impressed that our Federal government is a "going concern" and a
remarkable "success"-he quotes Gallileo, "e pur si muove"-he protests that its
uniqueness is an inherent quality of the system and must remain inviolable. The
operation of the American Constitution as paramount law has engendered a distinctly
• Brogan, Government of the People 381 (1933).
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American way, national habits of government, and that sane moderate reaction and
bounce to problems which is convincing evidence of the substantive identity and
potential elasticity of a fundamental law which is both supreme and comprehensive.
The intervening chapters on Party System, Race and Politics, Machines and Bosses,
and Politicsand Morals disclose an amazingly detailed knowledge (though not as profound as that displayed in the other two chapters) of American politics and the intense
interest with which the author has probed the meaning, motives, and motivations behind
the interplay and congeries of influences which weave the multicolored quilt of our
national political experiences. Those who have read this volume before this year's
national conventions undoubtedly understood and enjoyed these events and the campaigns that followed with more knowledgeable familiarity and discernment. From behind
the scenes of political machinations and the great American shows there emerges the
salutary fact of stability and progress, amenable to a prevailing consensus which has
marked the American citizenry with the quality of the character of the constitutional
system.
"And the American voter, politician, publicist, professor is far more soaked in the
presuppositions of the present system, far more broken into its ways than, perhaps, he
realizes. Good political habits-and American habits are, on the whole good (no more
can be said of British habits)-are too rare a thing to be thrown away in the world
of today The American people are right not to let the best be the enemy, not only
of the good, but even of the slightest improvements that the system is capable of
without changing its basic character." (p. 387).
Students of American politics and of political science ow.e Professor Brogan a cheerful debt of gratitude. He has made learning a delight. They may, thanks to him,
discover the great wonder of the American experiment and appreciate with increased
admiration its distinct uniqueness. His brilliant, witty style is not likely to prove a
cure for insomnia. It is a fond hope that Americans may come to know and admire
their country as this English observer has.
JOSEPH F. COS, NZo, S. J.f

By Thomas Reed
AND VARIETIES IN CONSTrrunTioNA. INTEnPRETATio..
Powell. Columbia University Press, New York: 1956. Pp. 215.

VAGARIES

As one of the great many unwashed of the world, I once cried when I vas told by
my widowed mother that she could not afford to send me to Harvard Law School
and ordered me to double register at Andrew D. White's University Law School, named
for that democratic Quaker, Ezra Cornell who dared to give college degrees to plumbers
and farmers allergic to Greek and Latin, not to mention women. My tears were wasted.
At Comell, in summer school, I took classes with both Scott and Frankfurter, and
studied under so many distinguished visiting and Cornell Professors in my almost four
years there, that I have always thought my failure to attend at Cambridge was a blessing in disguise.
Nevertheless, as generations of Harvard Law School students have regaled me with
their classroom joy of having Thomas Reed Powell teach them Constitutional Law,
I have come to regret deeply not knowing a teacher who so greatly inspired so many.
It was his great sense of humor, and the impudence of George Bernard Shaw, I am sure,
that has made him so beloved. I would hazard the guess that "T.R.P." found it difficult to
behave in class and that this caused his students to love him. And it probably accounts
for Harlan Stone's bringing him to Columbia Law, School and assuring William D.
- Professor of Political Philosophy, Fordham University, Graduate School.
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Guthrie that he was "sound," when Stone knew "darned well" that Powell was not,
from Guthrie's "point of view." (p. 46).
Turning to this lovely little book of Powell's last lectures, I reluctantly concur with
what Professor Paul A. Freund, Powell's replacement at Harvard, says in his Foreword:
"There is in these chapters an echo of that sharp gaiety and uninhibited candor that
made companionship with T.R.P. a bright delight." Freund says beautifully that
Powell's ". . . wisdom, like that of Socrates himself, was sheathed in playfulness" and
he reminds us that Vermonter Robert Frost has said: "The way of understanding is
partly mirth." (p. XI).
To one who knew not Powell except from his students and his law review articles,
this book of lectures is a great disappointment. Even though I teach constitutional
law and am interested in the cases, Powell's recitation of the facts of one case after
another is a dull as dishwater. Freund is a master of understatement when he says
there is only "an echo" of the real Powell. I would say it was merely an echo of an
echo.
But when you hear it, you recognize it and thrill to it whether you agree or not.
Speaking of Holmes, whom Powell adores, his real self emerges to take a vicious crack
at those of us who do not admire Oliver Wendell as he did. Speaking of Holmes' view
that a practical solution is often preferable to a logical or philosophical distinction,
Powell comments: "Such a point of view is anathema to a group of contemporary
writers of a certain eschatological (the word must be spelled and pronounced correctly)
persuasion who fill the law reviews with denunciations of Holmes because he is skeptical
about the dictates of 'natural law,' so-called. Pious prattlers of an unanalyzed doctrine, they miss the greatness, the wisdom and the ethical values of Holmes." (p. 36).
As for the Constitution, T.R.P. assures you that "like Topsy, it just 'growed.'"
(p. 3). And he pays his disrespect to ". . . some twentieth-century official remarks
from some Supreme Court Justices who seek to impress upon us in effect that it is not
they that speak but the Constitution that speaketh in them." Powell says: "Somehow this
reminds me of the biographer who wrote of Gladstone that his conscience was not his
guide but only his accomplice." (p. 28). And he adds: "It will ever remain a mystery
to me how intelligent jurists can make these professions of nonparticipation in the
judicial process." (p. 28).
Powell's impishness is momentarily displayed when he discusses decisions of Chase
and Johnson of the Marshall Court that indicate that laws which violate natural law
are unconstitutional. In the course of his quoted remarks, Johnson, J. said that "...
a principle .. .will impose laws even on a deity" 1 and this prompts T.R.P. to say:
"Unhappily there seem to be issues of jurisdiction and procedure here, which Mr.
Justice Johnson leaves without explication. It must be doubted whether mandamus
will lie. In my book, the writ runneth not so high." (p. 31).
Powell apparently re-read Marshall's opinions before delivering these lectures in
April and May of 1955. A bit earlier that year, on the anniversary of Marbury v.
Madison2 (February), he gave a lecture at William and Mary College as part of its
Marshall Bi-Centennial Celebration. This accounts for his frequent detailed reference
to Marshall's opinions and his delightful conclusion that: "For all his firm convictions"
Marshall "left fairly wide scope for play in the constitutional joints." (p. 31). What
a delightful way to put it!
It is interesting to hear Powell say that despite his years of teaching Marshall's
opinions, he failed to understand the significance of Gibbons v. Ogden3 or Brown v.
1. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 143 (1810).
2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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Maryland4 until he did these James S. Carpenter Lectures at Columbia. He asls: "Was
it my feebleness of mind, were even judicial majorities somewhat errant or even perverse and foolish? The supposedly great teachers of common law subjects were able
to paint pretty pictures and perfect geometric patterns. Why couldn't I do it in
public law as they did it in private law?" (p. 33).
During the Marshall Bi-Centennial some of us have had fun speculating how John
Marshall would have voted on the New Deal laws during the crisis in the Court in
1937. Powell declares he does not know, but says: "It is for me enough that Marshall's
superb opinions afforded texts in support of many exercises of national authority for
purposes undreamed of in his day." (p. 56).
As a phrasemaker one can see that T.R.P. was a genius. "The Lochner case was later
overruled by the Bunting case without being mentioned at its own funeral." (p. 39).
Noting that LochnerP because not cited, could be quoted with approval by Mr. Justice
Sutherland in the Adkins 6 case, Powell remarks: "It is judicial heads that count. Five
Supreme Court heads of the particular moment voted [in Adkins] the condemnation
[of the federal minimum wage bill for women], although 35 of the 45 judges who sat
in all courts on the question voted for its validity." (p. 40).
One of the most interesting parts of the Powell lectures is his discussion of Mr.
Justice Roberts. As T.R.P. saw it, Roberts in his early opinions assured the railroad
men in declaring unconstitutional their pension act, and the farmers in declaring
"Triple A" unconstitutional, "that it was the men of 1789 and not he who saved them
from Congressional charity," that he was "almost an automaton" as his only duty as a
Judge was "to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute
which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former." (p. 42).
Powell remarks that the railroad men and the farmers must have been amazed to learn
that the dissenters (Chief Justice Hughes, and Justices Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo)
"were not bright enough to know it" and "must have been without the right kind of
precision instruments for measuring angles, areas and comers." (p. 43).
Speaking ad hominem, T.R.P. says:
"The thesis which underlies the title of this series of lectures ["Vagaries and Varieties in Constitutional Interpretation"] could be amply supported by the kaleidoscopic
voting of Mr. Justice Roberts during his judicial career. He saw a somewhat flickering
white light on the road to Damascus after the election of 1936 and before the proposal
of the so-called Court plan of 1937. The light grew stronger and steadier later. Yet in
his last two terms he was in dissent in 93 out of the ISI cases in which the court
was divided. In one third of the dissents he was alone. ... Thus in these two periods
before and after 1937, not only was the court divided against itself, but considering
his full fifteen years of service, Mr. Justice Roberts might be said to have been divided
against himself." (pp. 81-82).
It is surprising to observe Powell's saying:
"Taney's mind seems to me markedly neater than that of Marshall, and his arguments are less open to refutation. Marshall was more intricate, more philosophical,
clever at turning sharp comers, and his elocution is more sonorous than Taney's--gifts
which doubtless are literary virtues but not necessarily judicial ones. Alarshall was
a nation builder, which Taney was not. As a creative statesman Marshall built superstructures on the foundation laid by the Fathers, but Taney in my view kept closer
4. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1S27).
5. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
6. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 548 (1923).
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to that foundation than did Marshall, with always the tragic exception of his Dred
Scott enormity as to the absence of national power to forbid slavery in the territories."
(p. 151).
Not sharing this view, I suspect Powell does not either, as later on he says:
"Taney insisted that it had become established that the states enjoy a concurrent
power over commerce. If we might compare the decisions of this era in terms of their
results without caring about the theory or what I may dub the lexogamy, we might
be better satisfied than we are when wading through the too voluminous and too numerous opinions. Their composition must have taken a long time if the authors had to write
them out in long hand." (p. 152).
At one time Powell assumed that ratification of the Constitution by conventions instead of by the state legislatures made it unconstitutional under article XIII of the
Articles of Confederation. (p. 214). Because the national government was organized
before Rhode Island or North Carolina ratified, he says there was secession by eleven
states and that they coerced Rhode Island and North Carolina to ratify. (p. 214).
After the war between the states similar coercion was applied to the six unreconstructed
states to make them ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. (p. 215). "Another blot on
the Constitutional escutcheon is the assumed consent of Virginia to the creation of
West Virginia as an independent state." (p. 215). T.R.P. also thinks the separation
of the thirteen colonies from the Mother country ". . . contained elements of the
extralegal" but with Shavian wit he resigns himself to all these illegalities and concludes his lectures by saying:
"Fortunately, even in tracing the titles of real estate, there is not infrequently
needed the saving grace of prescription. Prescription may need to be invoked in making
acceptable the course of constitutional history and of constitutional law." (p. 215).
What a grand person and what a great teacher Thomas Reed Powell must have
been. So challenging! So witty! I wish in his last lectures he had allowed his wit to
flash more, but as I am sure he would be the first to tell you, had he not died in the
late summer of 1955, that this is a very peculiar review in that I have ferreted through his
"lucubrations on constitutional powers" (p. 157) to bring to you the flavor of his wit
and leave the rest for us dull professors, to consult when we want to analyze this
leading case or that, and need the invaluable help of Powell's penetrating mind.
ARTHUR JOHN KEEFFEf

THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1776-1791.

By Robert Allen Rutland,
University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill: 1955. Pp. 243.

The

Robert Allen Rutland, formerly a newspaperman and research associate with the
State Historical Society of Iowa, and presently on the staff of the Graduate Department of Journalism, at U.C.L.A., has fulfilled a long unrequited need for a volume
detailing the historical process whereby the Federal Constitution was invested with
the Bill of Rights. He combines the objectivity of the research scholar-he holds
graduate degrees from Cornell and Vanderbilt universities-with the reporter's expert
recording of human events, motives, and motivations. With remarkable restraint he
neither seeks to establish a thesis for the reader's acceptance nor project personal interpretations. Not until the last chapter does the author point to a lesson for our times
which the history of the Bill of Rights has fashioned for our counsel.
In the preface, the author states his purpose: "This book represents an effort to draw
together in one volume the story of how Americans came to rely on legal guarantees
- Professor of Law, Catholic University of America School of Law.
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for their personal freedom." (p. v.). The first nine chapters fully realize this worthy
objective. In a summary survey, the author makes brief references to the English
statutory and common law provisions for personal rights which the colonists brought
to the New World as their heritage. The Magna Carta of 1215 is historically significant
and symbolic for the future of constitutionalism in detailing in writing certain contractual rights, privileges and immunities against the whim of arbitrary government.
The writ of habeas corpus was slowly converted from its original purpose of summoning before the bench whomsoever the Court chose, to become, in the late seventeenth
century, an instrument for releasing a person unlawfully imprisoned. The early jury
of information became in time adjudicators of fact. The Statute of Merton of 1236
secured the right of the accused to counsel unless charged with felony or treason. The
first Statute of Westminster of 1275 proscribed excessive fines and bails. The petition
of Rights of 1628 and the Bill of Rights of 1689 reasserted the supremacy of law over
the royal prerogative. Press censorship, which the Licensing Act of 1662 established,
gave way gradually to the advantages of a free press in a parliamentary cause.
Lilburne's Case' before the Star Chamber in 1637 is renowned for its claim of privilege
against self-incrimination which an act of Parliament in 1641 acknowledged. Freedom
of religion in England was a distorted product of the Reformation and all the divisive
and antagonistic forces which religious upheaval disgorged. Not until the Tolerance
Act was the worship of Protestant nonconformists legalized. The Common law rights,
as Sir Edward Coke listed them in his Second Institutes (1642), included due process
of law, habeas corpus, imprisonment for cause, trial in vicinage, and the prohibition
against double jeopardy.
Pre-revolutionary American colonial history discloses a marked tendency to commit
this English heritage to written codes, to improve upon its imprecision, and to advance
beyond it. By charters, royal and proprietory grants, or by compacts drawn by the
people themselves, an American experiment in personal freedoms vas fashioned to
meet the distinctly New World aspirations. Obviously, freedom of press and -peech,
so instrumental for the cause of the Revolution, established themselves with greater
ease than in England and the causes for seditious libel were narrowly drawn. The
vague boundaries of cruel and unusual punishments were more clearly defined. In
recounting the sluggish struggle for religious freedom, the author for some unaccountable reason scarcely even mentions the Catholic Cecil Calvert's Toleration Act for the
benefit of all christians in Maryland. The immediate exemplar for the many bills
of rights which the newborn states would either prefix or incorporate into their state
constitutions was Virginia's Declaration of Rights of 1776. the work of George Mason,
who looms as the foremost champion in this history of legal securities for personal
liberties. Despite an emphatic prevailing insistence on the circumscription of power
by a written bill of rights, disparities between the theory and practice provoked
Madison, like many others, to observe: "Repeated violations of these parchment
barriers have been committed by overbearing majorities in every State."; and of his
own state: "In Virginia I have seen the bill of rights violated in every instance where
it has been exposed to a popular current." (pp. 81-82). Under the Articles of Confederation the safeguard of personal liberties was wholly a state concern. Congress,
however, in providing for the Northwest Territories, set some norms for the states yet
to come, and marked the turning point toward a future national provision for the
security of personal rights.
At the Convention in Philadelphia, the representatives of the Confederated States
labored to construct a sovereign Federal Government compatible with the integrity
of the member states. Not until the eleventh hour did George Mason raise his voice
1. 3 How. St. Tr. 1315 (Star Chamber, 1637).
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in protesting the absence of a Federal Bill of Rights. His "objections to the Constitution of the Government" alerted a genuine concern among many for such a
provision, as well as affording the Antifederhlists argumentative reason for their cause.
Providentially the wise counsel and astute statesmanship of young Madison prevailed
for amendment after adoption as against amendment prior to ratification, and the
"hold out plan" of Jefferson, who wrote from France. This great compromise and its
fulfillment under Madison's conscientious and judicious promotion, won the confidence
which the New Republic sorely needed.
In the last chapter the author in a cursory survey points to the times and conditions
when bills of rights are most vulnerable-times of war and when anxiety for internal
security prevails: the Alien and Sedition Laws, Lincoln's personal suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus at the outbreak of the Civil War, the effect of the Slaughterhouse
Case2 on the Federal application of the Fourteenth Amendment, the injustice inflicted
on American citizens of Japanese descent in the last World War, and the troublesome
doubts evoked by the use of the privilege of the Fifth Amendment before Congressional
Investigating Committees inquiring about subversive activities. Since 1920, the
Federal Government has assumed under its protective mantle the freedoms of the First
Amendment as they have been made restrictive of State action through the "liberty" and
"due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The determined resistence to
desegregation conclusively establishes the lesson which the author champions, a lesson
which history itself has fashioned for our counsel, namely, bills of rights are no more
than parchment barriers unless they draw their inward efficacy from moral persuasion and an enlightened public opinion.
This is an admirable book which every student and lecturer of American constitutional
history should use. By way of postscript, the reviewer reluctantly, in the light of the
rich merits of the volume, but nonetheless hopefully chooses to challenge a hard-to-die
historical fallacy which the author uncritically repeats in the first pages of his otherwise
learned book:
"Thus the American Revolution had its seeds in the Puritan Revolt of English
forbears, with the avowed goal of giving citizens the freedoms won a century earlier
in the mother country. Indeed, the Puritan Revolt furnished a philosophical basis
for the American events of 1765 onward . . . ." (p. 1).
The prime leaders who oposed the autocracy of the Stuarts in the events leading to
the famous Petition of Right, were men who were equally opposed to Puritan theories:
Sir Edwin Sandys, Sir Edward Coke, John Selden, Sir John Eliot, and Denzil Hollis.
It was these forerunners of the Whigs, the heirs of Bracton and Fortescue, who gave
direction to the evolution of that English constitutionalism in terms of which Lord
Somers and his associates justified the Revolution of 1688, and Burke defended the
constitutional ideas in the War of Independence. Burke and Lord Acton traced
the identity of the Old Whigs, whom they carefully distinguished from the New Whigs,
Fox, Price, and Priestley. One would think that the vaunted claims of Puritan liberties
and constitutionalism would silence before the brutal fact of a military Protectorate
and the wholehearted rejection of the Commonwealth by the Restoration.
JosEPH F. COSTANZO, S. J.+

2. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
" Professor of Political Philosophy, Fordham University, Graduate School.
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FREDpo 's FETTERS, THE ALimN AND SEDrrrio LAws AND A=ERXAN,. CIVIL Lm.mrns.
By James Morton Smith. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, Xew York: 1936.
Pp. 464.
Written and spoken ideas may lead to action; therefore, any political organization
which permits criticism of its policies, structure, methods, or even personnel may have
planted the seeds of its own destruction. The action which may be provoked by
written and spoken ideas, on the other hand, might promote improvement within the
political framework without destroying it. If criticism of an edsting political organization were effectively prohibited, a political status quo would be maintained and the
organization would not develop to meet the needs of society. Every political organization should, therefore, permit the maximum amount of freedom to criticise consistent
with its preservation. The difficult issue is to determine the point at Y:hich freedom
to criticise should not be permitted.
Mr. Justice Holmes in applying the Espionage Act of 1917 stated, "The question
in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a dear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."' The point beyond which
criticism will not be permitted is aptly described, but the location of this point is
elusive in particular factual situations. It is much easier to look at factual situations
from a hindsight point of view and evaluate the determination of the point beyond
which criticism should not have been permitted, than it is to locate such a point in
a current situation. Correctly locating such a point in a current situation is an indication of political wisdom.
Although the author states in the Preface: "This work was undertaken without any
particular regard for present-day implications," such implications are apparent. The
external threat during the administration of President John Adams was France; the
fear that some alien residents and some citizens would assist France and attempt to
overthrow the United States Government constituted the internal problem. In order
to counter this supposed threat the Federalists, who controlled both Houses of Congress, enacted the Alien Enemies Act, the Alien Friends Law, and the Sedition Law.
The author traces these acts through the legislative process and points out the
Constitutional issues involved. The Jeffersonian Republicans anticipated the possibility
of suppression of freedom of speech and press and fought their passage at every
opportunity. Although some of the Constitutional arguments of the Republicans are
convincing in the light of present day interpretations of the Constitution, these arguments failed to prevent the Federalists from accomplishing their purpose.
The enforcement of the Sedition Law constitutes a black mark in our judicial history.
The law was used to suppress and to attempt to intimidate the Republican opposition
to the Federalist party. Although the major enforcement effort was directed against
the press, the ridiculous extreme of the situation is illustrated by the fact that an
inebriated patron of a tavern was prosecuted and convicted for stating that he didn't
care if those who were firing a cannon in celebration of the arrival of the President
fired through John Adams' posterior section. (p. 270-74).
In many of the cases the trial judge's comments upon the evidence were so argumentative and prejudicial against the defendant that it would constitute reversible error
by modem standards. Likewise the trial judge's rulings on Constitutional issues were
shocking when compared with present day practice.2 Lav.yers will wonder how such
1. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
2. In the trial of James T. Callender, for example: "Judge Chase interrupted Callender's
counsel to deny that the charges in the indictment were merely opinions and not facts falsely
stated. Discarding judicial restraint, he bluntly brandcd Callender's book as false; the
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injustices could occur under our judicial system. The fact that the Federalists had
been in office since the formation of the new government and had appointed the Judges
constituted one factor. The fact that our republic was in its infancy, and the Judiciary
had not yet established a tradition of independent, objective fairness is another explanation. 3
The historical setting and development of the Alien and Sedition Laws as well as
the descriptions of the trials are excellent. Some lawyers may be slightly disappointed
that certain aspects of criminal procedure, for example, voir dire and the selection of
juries, are not covered, but the book is primarily a historical study and not a technical
law book. Nevertheless, it is certainly recommended reading for lawyers as well as
laymen. Not only will the reader enjoy the discussion of outstanding legal issues
which confronted our nation in its infancy, but this book will tend to impress the
reader with the value of fundamental rights which are sometimes taken for granted.
CHARLEs HARPER ANDERSONt

TiE RIGHT To LIFE. By A. Delafield Smith. The University of North Carolina Press,
Chapel Hill: 1955. Pp. 204.
This book is a pioneer work in presenting a legal approach to society's responsibility
to the individual person. So far, much has been written on the importance of a sociological approach to law and jurisprudence has ceased to be an ivory tower, becoming
more and more receptive to the findings of the social sciences. With this book the
science of law has come into its own. Law has much to take from sociology but it has
also much, if not more, to give. According to the author, "The central theme of social
reform is to produce a better legal environment, an environment more conducive
to the growth of the individual-this is also the goal that made the human race seek
a legally ruled society in the first place." (Emphasis added.) (Book Jacket). This is the
keynote of the whole book.
The author is not a mere speculative philosopher. His reflections and observations
are based upon his experiences during a long career of private work and public service.
From 1916 he was engaged in legal practice in New York City, and in 1937 he became
principal attorney of the newly formed Social Security Board, continuing as Assistant
General Counsel when that organization was merged in the new Federal Department.
It is not possible in this review to give a complete synopsis of the thirteen chapters,
dealing with the various relations between man and society and the intensely human
problems arising from the rapidly developing civilization of modern America. We can
only touch upon the main concepts running through the entire book.
The starting point of the author is the fact of a growing interdependence of men,
one upon the other. "The technics of civilization grow ever more technical. There is
no salvation for us save in the responses of our fellow man. . . .As individuals
we no longer draw our support from nature. Human society, with all its complexities
of social and economic organization, has intervened. We depend on our fellow men for
what we need." (pp. 10-11).
defendant's bad intentions seemed 'sufficiently obvious' to the judge." (p. 347-48). Judge
Chase finally drove defense counsel from the case by his continuous interruptions. (p. 352).
3. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), firmly established the principle
of judicial review. The Alien and Sedition Laws expired in 1801 with John Adams' term of
office.
t Associate Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of
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In face of such dependence, how can we still preserve our independence? This is the
main question for the author. We achieved our independence vis-a-tis nature, in spite
of our dependence on her, because she is dependable by reason of the laws which she
follows with the utmost constancy. So, the author maintains, a similar independence
can be preserved in society by virtue of a reinforced Rule of Law. But the democratic
way of maintaining the Rule of Law is entirely different from the totalitarian way.
In a democracy the state must not act like the super-boss, resorting to police power
and physical force in the distribution of wealth. "Law should teach us that it is the
fact of having a legal right to what we need, rather than the fact of having produced
or secured it by our own efforts, that furnishes the primary condition for preserving
human dignity and independence." (p. 7).
The task of public social administration is "to service legal rights," not to dispense
gratuities and charities. The author does not propose new measures of law. His
principal concern is to articulate the underlying philosophy of the Social Security
system, so that it may be carried out in the proper spirit. He regrets that a certain
"... hesitancy to put the service of fundamental needs on a legal footing still
characterizes most of our social and political activity in the field of human welfare."
(p. 108). He likes to see social legislation and its administration "... . motivated by
the aim of giving the individual a legal status and legal rights commensurate vith
his needs." (p. 103). The new system will not work smoothly unless it is solidly
supported by a sound ethical philosophy, which the author sums up as follovs:
"Does society come first or the individual? We do not, I think, aid children as a
social asset, in any ultimate sense. We must regard the individual as an end in himself.
Our ethical justifications do not require reinforcement from social ends. May we not
come to realize that society's greatest achievement is a mature, responsible, and highly
competent individual?" (p. 110).
Only a lawyer steeped in the tradition of constitutionalism and experienced in the
field of social work can counsel us, as the author does, to "... . strive to encompass
social measures in the scope of our fundamental legal guaranties of equal protection
and the right to be heard under law." (p. 118).
The author does not identify the Rule of Law with the rule of thumb. He reminds
us of the fundamental distinction ". . . between rights that money vill presumably
satisfy and those that it will not satisfy." (p. 119). In servicing personal rights, the
author sees the ". . . need for much more flexible judicial procedure." (p. 148).
For, ". . . personal rights do not lend themselves, in the same degree, to the scientific
precisions of property law. Ideal interpretation of them is vital if they are to prevaiL
Introducing the spirit of reason, sound thinking, and the strength that comes from
knowledge of one's right, is essential if the laws establishing personal rights are not
to be prejudiced in their operation." (pp. 192-93).
Four chapters, from the ninth to the twelfth, are dedicated to the problems in
connection with children. The author stresses on the one hand the importance of
appointing private guardians for the "wards of the state," and on the other hand
the indispensability of ultimate judicial control. "In the judiciary, and in the judiciary
alone, can we hope to establish the necessary consideration for fundamental rights
and prerogatives of the individual in harmony with the conditions which the social
order requires." (p. 175). But the judiciary can never take the place of a private
guardian, and while it holds the private guardian accountable to it, it is the private
guardian that can really take the place of the father and mother in the heart of the
child. A trained social worker, serving as a private guardian, and working under
the authority of the court within the legal framework, may be able to transform
a delinquent into a wonderful personality. For, as the author points out, ".... it is
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not working in an authoritative setting that prejudices professionalism. Rather
it is the exercise of authority." (p. 187).
The author, like a true American, does not believe in forcing anyone, whether child
or adult, into the right way of life. The ward must be led patiently and tactfully to
see the point, for unless his reason is convinced, to beat him to his knees will only
result in greater rebelliousness. Authority there must be, but like the sword it should
be kept in the scabbard. The author uses a concrete illustration which to me is worth
a hundred pages of theorizing:
"If my foster child refuses to go to school, I can put my arms around him and tell
him I love him; I can work over him, climbing the stairs to his bedroom again and
again, and if I win, I can start him off to school and he will go there and study, but
if I attempt a short cut, or my wife exerts upon him the great force of her irresistible
will, he will seize the first avenue of escape, and the teacher will report later that
Charles did not attend school that day." (p. 145).
This is an age of involvements. The short cut is like cutting the Gordian knot. The
American way is to untie it with patience, love and a great deal of good humor. The
process may be slow, but eventually it is bound to conquer all difficulties. The whole
outlook of the author is like that of Confucius, who said:
"Lead them by the political power, keep them in order b' penalties, and the people
will indeed try to avoid the penalties, but they lose their sense of shame. Lead them
by moral virtues, keep them in order by good manners, and the people will not only
retain their sense of shame but also be reformed at heart."*
Confucius did not quite succeed, because he did not realize the necessity of a legal
framework which safeguards moral education against arbitrary personal government.
America, with the help of Christianity on the one hand, and the Rule of Law on the
other, may yet succeed in developing the humanism that Confucius and other great
humanists of the past have dreamed of. Furthermore, it will be a humanism into which
all the wonderful discoveries in the physical and mental sciences will have been
assimilated.
The book is one of desiderata. It aims only at a reorientation of our thinking about
social problems. We cannot, of course, expect the problems to be thoroughly treated
in one volume. But as a book of reorientation, and as a statement of the problems,
it is both provocative and suggestive.
There are two points where the author seems to err by exaggeration. One point
is that he thinks that as time goes on, police power will gradually give way to the tax
power. As a matter of fact, police power will always be needed in many fields excepting, perhaps, social legislation. Moreover, the tax power, important as it is, is after all
only a function, which cannot be made into a foundation of a social or legal philosophy.
The fact that the courts have justified social legislation by the tax power rather than
police power only means that they have to find some technical reason for upholding
it. But to a legal philosopher no technical reason can be regarded as the ultimate
reason. Tax power is no panacea any more than police power. You can tax the people
to death as well as to life. All depends upon justice, reasonableness and conduciveness
to the common good of the people. These latter are the real foundation of jurisprudence. I doubt that the author confuses a mere means with the end. But there
are certain passages in chapter five that may possibly give a wrong impression.
The other point that calls for some comment is that the author does not seem
to do justice to the social function of charities as inspired by true charity or love. The
charities are the real harbingers of social legislation. No matter how advanced the law
may be, there will always be room for love-inspired charities. Law may legalize
* Confucius. The Analects. bk. 1, c. 3 (translated by the author).
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the charities, but love will still be ministering to the basic needs of man, which v'ilU
continue to grow in quality as well as in quantity. I do not quite see eye to eye with
the author -when he says: "Our ethics, our charitable instincts, and our benevolent
attitudes should be merged in our laws, and become integrated with them. We need
to narrow the gap between the law and ethical action." (p. 115). To say that certain
past and present charities should be legalized is one thing; but to say that our ethies
and ckaritable instintsshould be merged in our laws is quite another. The law, however
humanly administered, has its limits. Our ethics and charitable instincts can never
be merged in our laws, and even if they could, to merge them in the laws would be to
kill the goose that lays the golden egg of social legislation.
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